The relationship of consciousness to brain, which Schopenhauer grandly referred to as the "world knot," remains an unsolved problem within both philosophy and science. The central focus in what follows is the relevance of science---from psychoanalysis to neurophysiology and quantum physics-to the mind-brain puzzle. Many would argue that we have advanced little since the age of the Greek philosophers, and that the extraordinary accumulation of neuroscientific knowledge in this century has helped not at all. Increas- ingly, philosophers and scientists have (...) tended to go their separate ways in considering the issues, since they tend to differ in the questions that they ask, the data and ideas which are provided for consideration, their methods for answering these questions, and criteria for judging the acceptability of an answer. But it is our conviction that philosophers and scientists can usefully interchange, at least to the extent that they provide co~straints upon each other’s preferred strategies, and it may prove possible for more substantive progress to be made. Philosophers have said some rather naive things by ignoring the extraordinary advances in the neurosciences in the twentieth century. The skull is not filled with green cheese! On the other hand, the arrogance of many scientists toward philosophy and their faith in the scientific method is equally naive. Scientists clearly have much to learn from philosophy as an intellectual discipline. Manifestations of Mind: Some Conceptual and Empirical Issues Walter B. Weimer Pages 5-31 The Mysterious “Split‘: A Clinical Inquiry into Problems of Consciousness and Brain Peter H. Knapp Pages 37-69 Mind, Brain, and the Symbolic Consciousness Irwin Savodnik Pages 73-98 Brain and Free Will John C. Eccles Pages 101-121 An Old Ghost in a New Body C. Wade Savage Pages 125-153 How Dogmatic Can Materialism Be? John C. Eccles Pages 155-160 Mental Phenomena as Causal Determinants in Brain Function R. W. Sperry Pages 163-177 Consciousness as an Emergent Causal Agent in the Context of Control System Theory E. M. Dewan Pages 181-198 Reductionism, Levels of Organization, and the Mind-Body Problem William C. Wimsatt Pages 205-267 Mind, Structure, and Contradiction Gordon G. Globus Pages 271-293 Problems Concerning the Structure of Consciousness Karl H. Pribram Pages 297-313 The Role of Scientific Results in Theories of Mind and Brain: A Conversation among Philosophers and Scientists E. M. Dewan, John C. Eccles, Gordon G. Globus, Keith Gunderson, Peter H. Knapp, Grover Maxwell et al. Pages 317-328 Scientific Results and the Mind-Brain Issue: Some Afterthoughts Grover Maxwell Pages 329-358. (shrink)

This book results from a group meeting held at the Institute for Scientific Exchange in Torino, Italy. The central aim was for scientists to think together in new ways with those in the humanities inspired by quantum theory and especially quantum brain theory. These fields of inquiry have suffered conceptual estrangement but now are ripe for rapprochement, if academic parochialism is put aside. A prevalent theme of the book is a moving away from individual elements and individual actors acting upon (...) each other, toward a coordinate hermeneutic dynamics that manifests as a coherent totality. Among the topics covered are image in photography and in neuroscience; language; time; brain and mathematics; quantum brain dynamics and quantum communication.". (shrink)

CHAPTER Heidegger and the Quantum Brain In any case the orientation to "I" and " consciousness" and re-presentation ...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 12.3 (2005) 229-234 [Access article in PDF] Nonlinear Dynamics at the Cutting Edge of Modernity: A Postmodern View Gordon Globus Keywords nonlinear dynamics, modernity, postmodernity, quantum brain theory, free will, self-organization, autopoiesis, autorhoesis Although nonlinear dynamical conceptu-alizations have been applied to psychia-try for over 20 years,1 they have not had significant impact on the field. Unfortunately Heinrichs' very thoughtful contribution to the discussion is (...) unlikely to move such disinterest. Pragmatically successful paradigms in the phase of Kuhnian "normal science" are highly resistant to change. There is no crisis that besets triumphalist biological psychiatry that might lead to clinical or scientific revolution. At the same time, as I suggest at the end of this commentary, the ideas of nonlinear dynamics may not be revolutionary enough, remaining staunchly within the framework of modernity.In what follows I discuss four issues related to Heinrichs' article. First, I try to enrich his presentation of nonlinear dynamics by bringing in the role of self-organization in the evolution of nonlinear dynamical brain systems and by making the nonlinear dynamics "tunable." Second, I discuss whether Heinrichs succeeds in avoiding the dualism of the biopsychosocial model that he criticizes. Third, I look at the issue of "free will," which Heinrichs would understandably like to avoid. Finally, I mention a new form of dynamics, namely thermofield dynamics, which I think is more promising than nonlinear dynamics. Self-Organizing Self-Tuning Nonlinear Dynamical Systems In the case of psychiatry, we are not considering nonlinear dynamical systems like the weather or an ecosystem, but the brain's neural networks in terms of nonlinear dynamics with all its chaos. There is a principle of such systems of neural networks that Heinrichs does not bring out, although it is extremely important for them. These systems are self-organizing under a Hamiltonian principle of "least energy." To use Hopfield and Tank's (1986) terms, nonlinear dynamical neural networks self-organize toward attractors that minimize the "computational energy" of the system, or for Smolensky (1988), self-organize toward "harmony," or for Globus (1995, 2003), in a Heideggerian vein, self-organize to maximize "belonging-together." In this elaborated framework, rational deliberation is one constraint among many on a self-organizing nonlinear dynamical process. [End Page 229]Heinrichs brings out beautifully the nonlinear dynamical way of thinking clinically. This is not the dynamics of mechanistic psychodynamics, which features psychological forces in vectorial conflict—id versus superego and their compromises—but a flowing evolution of states in which small changes in initial state may have large effects (nonlinearity) on the state trajectory. To live a life is often to feel surprise, which nonlinear dynamics with its chaotic regimes well portrays.But there is a way that classical Freud and nonlinear dynamical neural networks do come together—in the "economics," discharges and conservations of libidinal energy, expenditures and credits in Derrida's (1978) accounting. Heinrichs does not mention this similarity. The economic principles differ between Freud's late nineteenth-century thermodynamics and Heinrichs' late twentieth-century nonlinear dynamics, it is true, but it is all economics.Freud called this economic functioning the "pleasure principle" in which "libido" seeks to discharge its instinctual energy store, reducing the level of instinctual tension. This "primary process" proceeds to an attractor by the quickest, most direct way possible, whereas the "secondary process" defers reduction in instinctual tension, subjecting the primary process to thought. Self-organizing directly to the attractor is the primary process with which the secondary process interferes, introducing deferral.The economy of nonlinear dynamics pictures a "landscape," a variegated topography with peaks and valleys. Each point on the topography represents a state. Peak points are repellors—for example, states in which the phobic object is approached—and the lowest points of the valleys are attractors—for example, obsessions and compulsions. The path of occupied states self-organizes away from repellors and toward attractors. This topography is an energy landscape. Its dynamics spontaneously tends—"self-organizes"—toward least energy/high-constraint satisfaction. Freud's pleasure principle is just the Hamiltonian least energy... (shrink)

Quantum degrees of freedom greatly enrich nonlinear systems, which can support nonlocal control and superposition of states. Basing my discussion on Yasue’s quantum brain dynamics, I suggest that the Cartesian subject is a cybernetic process rather than a substance: I am nonlocal control and my meanings are cybernetic variables. Meanings as nonlocal attunements are not mechanically determined, thus is it concluded we have freedom to mean.

Freud considered dreams to be compositions of past waking experiences but this theory is untenable: (1) the process of compositing disparate memories into the seamless dream life is miraculous, and (2) authentically novel dream worlds are experienced. Dennett makes dreams into purely cognitive affairs, a matter of scripts, denying their perceptual appearing. I suggest that dreams are de novo constructions of actual perceptual worlds, not put together from memory scraps. Implications for waking perception are considered.

If the brain has a level of quantum functioning that permits superposition of possibilities and nonlocal control of states, then new answers to the problem of the consciousness/brain relation become available. My discussion is based on Yasue and co-workers’ account of a quantum field theory of brain functioning, called ‘quantum brain dynamics’. In the framework developed each person can properly state: ‘I am nonlocal control and my meanings are control variables.’ Cognition is identified with a conjugate reality and perception is (...) where quantum cognition, quantum memory and the quantum re-presentation of quantum reality meet and make a conjugate match. A new problem arises with regard to the world, however, since on this interpretation the one world-in-common is relinquished in favour of multiple parallel world-thrownnesses. But since quantum physics remains to this day deeply uncommonsensical, we should not hope to provide quantum solutions in consciousness studies without overturning the deepest convictions of common sense. (shrink)

A possible relation between Derrida's deconstruction of metaphysics and connectionism is explored by considering diffeacuterance in neural nets terms. First diffeacuterance, as the crossing of Saussurian difference and Freudian deferral, is modeled and then the fuller 'sheaf of diffeacuterance is taken up. The metaphysically conceived brain has two versions: in the traditional computational version the brain processes information like a computer and in the connectionist version the brain computes input vector to output vector transformations non-symbolically. The 'deconstructed brain' neither processes (...) information nor computes functions but is spontaneously economical. (shrink)

Classical mechanics cannot naturally accommodate consciousness, whereas quantum mechanics can, but the Heisenberg/Stapp approach, in which consciousness randomly collapses the neural wave function, leaves the conscious function unrestricted by known physical principles. The Umezawa/Yasue approach, in which consciousness offers superposed possibilities to the match with sensory input, is based in the first physical principles of quantum field theory. Stapp thinks of the brain as a measuring device, like a Geiger counter, and overlooks that the brain upholds second-order quantum fields that (...) are symmetry-conserving with respect to reality. Consciousness is cybernetic rather than having a random function. (shrink)

Biological foundations of the psychoneural identity hypothesis are explicated and their implications discussed. "Consciousness per se" and phenomenal contents of consciousness per se are seen to be identical with events in the (unobserved) brain in accordance with Leibniz's Law, but only informationally equivalent to neural events as observed. Phenomenal content potentially is recoverable by empirical means from observed neural events, but the converse is not possible. Consciousness per se is identical with events which do not represent anything distal to sensory (...) receptor-transducer systems. Thus, on the psychoneural identity hypothesis, consciousness per se comprises directly physical events-in-themselves rather than being a Euclidean representation of physical events as is the case for phenomenal content. After comparing consciousness per se to "onta," a paradox is suggested: rather than being irreducible to physical reality, consciousness per se is the only experience congruent with the ultimate nature of physical reality as conceived by contemporary physics. (shrink)

The "Chinese Room" controversy between Searle and Churchland and Churchland over whether computers can think is subjected to Derridean "deconstruction." There is a hidden complicity underlying the debate which upholds traditional subject/object metaphysics, while deferring to future empirical science an account of the problematic semantic relation between brain syntax and the perceptible world. I show that an empirical solution along the lines hoped for is not scientifically conceivable at present. An alternative account is explored, based on the productivity of neural (...) nets, in which the semantic relation is found to be dynamical - a spontaneous, stochastic, self-organizing process. (shrink)

Heidegger has provided a profound account of human existence in terms of the to-be-da. Even though Heidegger disregarded its brain machine basis (and even though brain scientists disregard Heidegger), the issue of the Dasein's machine basis is raised by the empirically extremely well confirmed “supervenience” of the Dasein on the brain. Since the Turing machine will not do as basis for the Dasein, as Dreyfus has shown, contemporary functionalism cannot resolve the issue. Instead an “existential functionalism,” which looks to some (...) other kind of machine than the computer, is called for. A machine that continuously tunes filters on input and that detects any match between abstract properties of the input flux and filter specifications was considered. A match points to those tuning rules whose abstract conditions have been satisfied by input, and the rules thus selected are enabled to generate their own fulfillment through mechanisms that can presently be only speculated about. Such a machine cannot sustain direct perception but is “methodologically solipsistic.” At the most general level of description, the wet machine that provides a supervenience base for the Dasein is to be considered a “windowless monad.”. (shrink)

Deep brain stimulation of the subthalamic nucleus or the globus pallidus is an established treatment for Parkinson’s disease that yields a marked and lasting improvement of motor symptoms. Yet, DBS benefit on gait disturbances in PD is still debated and can be a source of dissatisfaction and poor quality of life. Gait disturbances in PD encompass a variety of clinical manifestations and rely on different pathophysiological bases. While gait disturbances arising years after DBS surgery can be related to disease (...) progression, early impairment of gait may be secondary to treatable causes and benefits from DBS reprogramming. In this review, we tackle the issue of gait disturbances in PD patients with DBS by discussing their neurophysiological basis, providing a detailed clinical characterization, and proposing a pragmatic programming approach to support their management. (shrink)

continent. 1.2 (2011): 76-77. Please click to listen to the mp3 files of deep brain recordings of individual brain cells, the smallest unit of the brain, in a whole, intact living brain. Each brain region’s cells possess an electrical signature. During recordings electrical signals are transformed into sound to facilitate auditory identification of cells during a process called “mapping.” Subthalamic nucleus by continent Cortex by continent Mapping is an important step in successfully identifying and localizing the appropriate target site in (...) the brain for an experimental therapeutic procedure called deep brain stimulation which has been used for patients with movement disorders and, more recently, for patients with psychiatric disorders. Thalamus by continent I have pursued a career as a neuroscientist for the past decade because I wanted to learn about the mind. In my most recent research, I record electrical activity from individual cells in the brain, and look at individual brain cells with a high resolution, electron microscope. Globus Pallidus (internal segment) by continent Globus Pallidus (external segment) by continent The closer I examine the brain, the less I learn about the mind. Rather, what has been most informative about the mind is how people—neuroscientists and non-neuroscientists alike—interpret neuroscience data. Some cognitive neuroscientists have proposed the qualities we hold most precious as humans, like morality and free will, exist only in the context of human interaction. Likewise, I propose that the mind does not exist in a vacuum and one’s mind only necessitates distinction in a social context, and the mind’s existence may only be relevant due to its relative relationships. In sum, bodies have brains. People have minds. Striatum by continent I invite readers to reflect on and/or refute these statements after listening to these recordings of the brain in action. These regions are part of the cortico-basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical circuit, which is thought to possess parallel, functionally segregated loops including a motor-movement circuit and limbic-emotional circuit which work together to generate behavior (e.g. motivated movements) and have been researched for their role in Parkinson’s disease as well as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. EDITOR'S SUGGESTED RESOURCES Michael Gazzaniga's lecture, “Free Yet Determined and Constrained” at Edinburgh University Gifford Lectures in 19 October, 2009 is an excellent discussion of the field. It can be viewed on Edinburgh University's Youtube channel . The Cognitive Neuroscience of the Mind . Eds. Patricia A. Reuter-Lorenz, Kathleen Baynes, George R. Mangun, and Elizabeth A. Phelps. Cambridge: MIT Press. 2010. Print. (shrink)

The growth of managed care was accompanied by concern about the impact that changes in health care organization would have on the doctor-patient relationship. We now are in a “post-managed care era,” where some of these changes in health care delivery have come to pass while others have not. A re-examination of the DPR in this setting suggests some surprising results. Rather than posing a new and unprecedented threat, managed care was simply the most recent of numerous strains on the (...) DPR that have occurred throughout the century. These strains are a constant, inevitable consequence of the varying needs and concerns of patient and physicians as they seek to balance their desires for a certain type of DPR with their simultaneous desire for other aspects of care such as lower costs, greater technological sophistication, and improved outcomes. (shrink)

Changes in healthcare financing increasingly rely upon patient cost-sharing to control escalating healthcare expenditures. These changes raise new challenges for physicians that are different from those that arose either under managed care or traditional indemnity insurance. Historically, there have been two distinct bases for arguing that physicians should not consider costs in their clinical decisions—an “aspirational ethic” that exhorts physicians to treat all patients the same regardless of their ability to pay, and an “agency ethic” that calls on physicians to (...) be trustworthy advisors to their patients. In the setting of greater patient cost-sharing, physicians' aspiration and agency roles increasingly conflict. Satisfactorily navigating the new terrain of consumer-driven healthcare requires physicians to consider these two roles and how they can best be reconciled so as to maximize quality of care while respecting the heterogeneity of patients' financial resources and willingness to pay. (shrink)

Contemporary religious studies contains many studies of Orthodox theology of the twentieth century, but there are almost no studies of the most prominent modern trend in Orthodox theology, neo-patristics. In particular, in the works of L. Voronkova, G. Gabinsky, M. Gordienko, Y. Kalinin, P. Kurochkin, I. Mozgovy, V. Molokov, M. Novikov, N. Petelinskaya, V. Chertikhin, A. Chertkov, a thorough analysis of tendencies was carried out Modernism of Orthodox theology of the Russian Church. Of these, only M. Novikov briefly criticizes the (...) views of V. Lossky, a representative of Neopatristics, but the researcher does not realize the originality of this trend in Orthodox theology. Especially the tendencies of the development of Orthodox theology of spiritual academic schools of the XIX-beg. XX century. M. Ivanov, M. Glubokovsky, I. Kondratieva, G. Pankov, O. Pechurina, O. Sarapin, L. Fokina were thoroughly researched, but these studies were usually conducted outside the context of all Orthodox theology of the XX century. (shrink)

The Stepford Wives, a novel by Ira Levin, provides the theme for this allegory. The men of Stepford belong to the Men’s Association. Their wives are “perfect”, in that they do nothing other than clean, cook, preen, and provide satisfaction without argument for their husbands. They are, furthermore, content with their lot, and believe that their previous interests and freedoms were self indulgent. Levin never informs his readers how the men came to obtain total mastery over their “Stepford wives”, although (...) there is the suggestion that the real wives have been replaced by robotic lookalikes. (shrink)